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Abstract. In this work we analyse five popular commercial password
managers for security vulnerabilities. Our analysis is twofold. First, we
compile a list of previously disclosed vulnerabilities through a compre-
hensive review of the academic and non-academic sources and test each
password manager against all the previously disclosed vulnerabilities. We
find a mixed picture of fixed and persisting vulnerabilities. Then we carry
out systematic functionality tests on the considered password managers
and find four new vulnerabilities. Notably, one of the new vulnerabilities
we identified allows a malicious app to impersonate a legitimate app to
two out of five widely-used password managers we tested and as a result
steal the user’s password for the targeted service. We implement a proof-
of-concept attack to show the feasibility of this vulnerability in a real-life
scenario. Finally, we report and reflect on our experience of responsible
disclosure of the newly discovered vulnerabilities to the corresponding
password manager vendors.
Keywords: Vulnerability Testing · Password Managers · Password Man-
ager Security · Authentication.
1 Introduction
Passwords remain the dominant authentication mechanism in the digital realm
despite their shortcomings. Furthermore, they are expected to persist as a pri-
mary authentication mechanism for the some time [6]. Among the tools that
can greatly reduce the cognitive burden of remembering multiple passwords for
multiple services are password managers. Hence, their use is strongly advocated
by security experts, including the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre [13].
A password manager is an encrypted vault that stores any number of creden-
tials for the user and is accessed by a single master password. In this context,
a credential is a username-password pair that authenticates the user to a web-
based service. Over and above individual use, a commercial password manager
usually provides extra features, e.g. credential sharing and admin interfaces, and
⋆ This is an accepted manuscript to appear in the proceedings of the 35th Int’l Conf.
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aims to increase enterprise security. Obviously, vulnerabilities in such an appli-
cation provide opportunities for malicious actors to extract credentials, compro-
mise commercial information, or violate employee privacy. Therefore, rigorous
security analysis of password managers is crucial.
Analyses focusing specifically on the security of password managers appear
within academic literature and other less formal publications such as blogs as
early as 2003. Each work usually reports one or more discovered vulnerabilities
and how they could be exploited in an attack against certain password man-
agers in the hope that password manager vendors eventually rectify these issues.
However, it is not clear to what extent reported issues apply to other password
managers and to what extent they are mitigated by corresponding vendors. In
fact, there does not seem to be any reference that aggregates the major security
vulnerabilities reported in the literature, and existing reports remain fragmented
in multiple sources. In this work we attempt to address this gap as well as re-
porting new vulnerabilities we discovered in our analyses.
We report the results of our work on analysing the security of the enterprise
editions of five major password managers: LastPass, Dashlane, Keeper, 1Pass-
word, and RoboForm. These password managers were chosen after a rigorous
selection process which considered popularity and features of the individual and
commercial offerings of 19 password managers. Our contributions are threefold:
1) We carried out a survey of both formally and informally published vulner-
abilities of password managers, identified six main vulnerabilities, tested current
versions of the five considered password managers against each vulnerability,
and report our results whether each password manager is susceptible to each
previously disclosed vulnerability.
2) Through comprehensive systematic testing of mobile, desktop, and web
applications (including browser extensions) of the considered password man-
agers, we discovered four new issues that can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities,
developed a proof-of-concept Android application to demonstrate how the most
serious issue might be used in a real-world phishing attack, and report on whether
each password manager is susceptible to each discovered vulnerability.
3) Following the principle of responsible disclosure, we engaged with the
corresponding password manager vendors and informed them of the newly dis-
covered vulnerabilities. We report and reflect on our experience of interacting
with these vendors.
Many modern browsers provide password management services on the side.
However, we focus on stand-alone password managers that provide a commercial
offering for organisations and do not consider browser password managers.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we review the liter-
ature on password manager security; Section 3 specifies our method for selecting
and analysing the password managers considered; Section 4 reports on our results
on both previously disclosed and newly discovered vulnerabilities and discusses
their feasibility and impact; Section 5 reports on our responsible disclosure to
the corresponding vendors; and concluding remarks come in Section 6.
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2 Related Work
In recent years password managers have been analysed a multitude of times, both
within and outside academia. Here we review the major reported vulnerabilities.
2.1 Autofill Vulnerabilities
An area that has been of substantial interest to researchers is the autofill feature
that password managers implement to increase their usability. A number of works
have exploited poor implementation of autofill to extract user’s credentials, in
some cases automatically [1,5,11]. In [11], a minimal survey implemented as an
HTML form was sent to users of multiple webmail services. The form contained
a visible question along with invisible email and password input boxes. The idea
was that the password managers would see the email as a login form with the
webmail domain as origin and autofill the credentials for the webmail service.
With auto-login enabled, merely opening the email would automatically fill in
the credentials and submit the form in some webmail services, and in others
the user was warned that a form is about to be submitted but would still be
vulnerable if they clicked through the warning.
2.2 Web-Based Vulnerabilities
A rigorous analysis of the security of five web-based password managers (in-
cluding two we consider here, LastPass and RoboForm) was performed by Li et
al. [8]. The authors found a diverse range of vulnerabilities ranging from classic
web vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting (XSS) and request forgery (CSRF)
to more specific authorisation and user interface vulnerabilities. Notably the au-
thors found that in some cases only authentication was carried out and not
authorisation. This allowed an attacker registered with the password manager
to successfully request a victim’s password to be shared with another party.
Bookmarklets were extensively used by password managers to provide browser
integration when extensions (a.k.a. add-ons) were not available, e.g. in many mo-
bile browsers. With the extended functionality of native APIs, and in view of the
inherent vulnerability of bookmarklet code execution, password managers have
moved on to providing separate applications on multiple operating systems, and
either have already discontinued bookmarklet support or discourage its use.
The vault encryption methods used in the enterprise versions of RoboForm
and LastPass have been analysed in [14] where the authors define a threat model
that takes into account two forms of attackers with different capabilities: outsider
attackers and insider attackers. The authors focus specifically on three forms of
attack: brute force attacks, local decryption attacks, and request monitoring
attacks. In LastPass, local decryption by outsider, brute force by outsider, and
brute force by insider attacks were all capable of retrieving a user’s master
password. In RoboForm, vulnerabilities were found in local decoding by outsider,
brute force by outsider, and server-side request monitoring by insider attacks.
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Dashlane was the subject of a security analysis in 2016 [4]. When attempting
to log on, if an invalid username is entered, a message stating ‘Incorrect login’ is
shown, whereas if an incorrect password is entered, a message stating ‘Incorrect
password’ is shown. This indicates that a username is registered with Dashlane
and would aid an attacker when attempting a brute force attack on usernames
and passwords. Although an attacker would need access to the victim’s devices
as Dashlane uses two-factor authentication (2FA) for any new devices, a device
authentication vulnerability meant that 2FA could be bypassed. This allows an
unauthorised device to access passwords.
2.3 Non-Academic Sources
In 2017, a vulnerability in the implementation of 2FA (via a QR code) in Last-
Pass [12] was found. The issue was that the URL where the QR code was stored
was a predictable hash of the user’s master password. An attacker that is hoping
to bypass 2FA will already know the victim’s password and, therefore, is capable
of accessing the QR code, which is needed to generate the valid temporary codes.
The vulnerability was likened to a safe within a building that can be opened with
the same key as that of the building door [12]. However, for the request to access
the QR code to be valid, a user has to be authenticated, but it was shown that
this could be defeated using a cross site request forgery vulnerability. LastPass
have since patched this vulnerability.
In 2016 a vulnerability was discovered in the LastPass extension URL parsing
code used to decide on whether to autofill a website [7]. In short, it meant
that a specially crafted URL was able to extract the credentials for arbitrary
websites. Browsers treat a URL like example.com/@twitter.com/@xyz.php as
from example.com while the extension treated it as from twitter.com since only
the last occurrence of the @ was considered. Hence, it was possible to confuse
the extension and allow an attacker to identify the credentials for a targeted
website. LastPass have since patched this vulnerability.
There does not seem to be a survey of password manager security analyses
bringing together an aggregated list of reported vulnerabilities. In this work, we
address this issue. Note that there is a related line of research on the security of
encrypted database formats used in password managers (see e.g. [3]) which con-
siders the threat model in which an adversary gets direct access to the password
manager vault. We do not consider this threat model here.
3 Method
We specify the methods we used in each step of this work in the following.
3.1 Identification of Password Managers
To ensure a wide range of password managers were considered, a comprehensive
survey of individual and commercial password managers was undertaken. This
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took into account the number of users documented by the password manager
vendors, install counts in application stores and recommendations by reputable
websites such as PCMag.com. Further, less publicised products were identified
by inputting terms such as ‘password manager’ into web search engines.
Once the search reached saturation, identified by a lack of new products ap-
pearing, each of the password managers listed was investigated and their features
compared. To make our final selection, we considered two characteristics: popu-
larity of the tool as an indicator of the number of users affected by a potential
vulnerability, and richness of features, as an indicator of both desirability for
companies as customers and at the same time diversity of attack vectors.
3.2 Identification of Previously Disclosed Vulnerabilities
A comprehensive review of the literature on password managers was carried
out. Besides, we examined general and tech news sources for any security issues
reported for password managers. We limit our presentation to vulnerabilities
that lend themselves to feasible and impactful attacks.
To keep our survey focused on password manager specific vulnerabilities, we
do not consider general web vulnerabilities such as XSS or CSRF for which there
are standard recommended solutions. Furthermore, given the gradual phaseout
and the inherent vulnerability of bookmarklets, we leave bookmarklet-specific
vulnerabilities out of the presented results here. Ultimately, the results of our
survey needs to be considered alongside the vulnerabilities listed by Li et al. [8],
and those considered by the literature on database format security (e.g. [3]) for
a more comprehensive view of password manager security.
3.3 Testing for Identified and New Vulnerabilities
After selecting the products for testing, a two-week enterprise trial was started
with each of the products consecutively. To begin, the systems were tested under
normal operation to identify any abnormalities. This involved completing a large
number of tasks using features that are available (to users as well as admins) in
the enterprise editions of the software. A comprehensive list of all the operations
that were performed is not presented here, but included the following:
– logging in as a user and an administrator;
– adding a password through the vault and automatic capture features;
– sharing passwords between users;
– updating shared passwords and individual passwords on multiple devices;
– linking a personal account to the corporate account;
– analysing activity reports and their accuracy; and
– adding and removing users from groups and roles.
Following the initial testing of standard features, all of the password managers
were tested against the identified previously disclosed vulnerabilities. Through
checking previously disclosed vulnerabilities across all of the password managers
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in the sample, it is possible to establish whether patches have been correctly
applied and whether the issues are common across password managers. The
abnormalities discovered through the initial testing were then capitalised on
through the development of proof of concept exploits.
Ethical Considerations: Throughout this work, ethical considerations have
been paramount. No live user account was used or attacked. All testing was car-
ried out using accounts that belong to the investigators. All vulnerabilities have
been responsibly disclosed to the vendors at least six months before publication.
4 Results
In this section we first give the detailed specifications of our test settings and then
provide our results on testing the selected password managers against previously
disclosed vulnerabilities and our discovery of new vulnerabilities.
Our search for password managers identified 19 applications supporting most
of the features that can be considered basic features for password managers,
e.g. password capture and encrypted storage, password generation, mobile app,
and autofill. Overall, we identified 27 features, including a number of desirable
additional security features, e.g. two-factor and biometric authentication, and
some that are especially desirable in a professional environment, e.g. password
sharing, security breach alerts, admin console, and API provision. The full list
of password managers and features we considered can be found in Appendix A.
From the 19 password managers identified, those with the greatest popularity
and richness of features were selected for testing. These password managers are
LastPass, Dashlane, Keeper, 1Password, and RoboForm.
The desktop components of the password managers were tested using a
laptop running Windows 10 Enterprise version 10.0.14393 build 14393 and
Chrome version 59.0.3071.115 where extensions were used. Any mobile com-
ponents were tested using an Android 7.0 phone. Note that Windows, Android,
and Chrome are respectively the current most widely-used OS, mobile OS, and
browser worldwide. Tested password manager versions are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Version numbers of the password managers tested.
OS
Password Manager
Dashlane LastPass Keeper 1Password RoboForm
Windows 4.8.2 4.1.60 10.8.1 6.6.439 8.3.7.7
Android 4.17.0.1995 4.2.762 10.7.0 6.5.3 8.0.9
4.1 Previously Disclosed Vulnerabilities
Our survey resulted in the identification of six main issues that we list in this
section. Our initial tests indicated that authorisation vulnerabilities discussed by
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Li et al. [8] appear to have been patched in all password managers we considered.
Hence, we do not list those vulnerabilities here in the interest of conciseness.
Two-Factor Authentication Seed Vulnerability: Disclosed for LastPass in
which the seed for enabling 2FA was stored at a predictable URL [12]. This was
tested on the password managers by initiating the 2FA set-up process and iden-
tifying whether the seed URL appear predictable based on any user information.
Element Inspection Vulnerability: Leakage of shared passwords through
DOM element inspector tools such as Chrome’s Inspect Element, as shown in
the Dashlane security analysis [4]. This can be tested by sharing limited access
to a password with another user, which allows them to use the password but
not see it. Following this, logging in as the other user and then using an element
inspector on the shared password exposes the password.
Registration Discovery Vulnerability: An indication of whether a username
is registered with the service through UI prompts, as shown in the Dashlane
security analysis [4]. This is tested through attempting to log in with an incorrect
username and then incorrect password.
URL Mismatch Vulnerability: Log in fields being filled with a username and
password, despite the source and destination URLs not matching [1].
HTTP(S) Autofill Vulnerability: Autofill policies do not distinguish between
HTTP and HTTPS when attempting to fill a credential that has been stored
with HTTPS on an HTTP version of the site [1]. This would enable a man-in-
the-middle attacker to impersonate an HTTP version of a popular website and
steal user credentials originally stored for the HTTPS version.
Ignoring Subdomains Vulnerability: Subdomains are ignored when filling
passwords [1]. This is tested with the university websites: york.ac.uk and
cs.york.ac.uk. An attacker in a subdomain can hence steal user credentials
for the parent domain or other subdomains. This is an issue in many websites
such as forums and blogs where different subdomains host different services.
Summary: Table 2 shows the results of testing the five password managers
against the vulnerabilities listed above. These vulnerabilities were tested using
the same processes and resources for all the password managers. As can be seen
from the table, at least one of the password managers is vulnerable to every
single issue apart from 2FA Seed vulnerability. The tested password managers
are most vulnerable to URL Mismatch, HTTP(S) Autofill, and Ignoring Subdo-
mains vulnerabilities, with all but one of the managers being susceptible to URL
Mismatch and all to HTTP(S) Autofill and Ignoring Subdomains vulnerabilities.
All of these vulnerabilities concern the web interfaces, and more specifically the
autofill feature, which has been an area of focus for previous works. Hence, it
was hoped that vendors had responded by making their software resilient to such
attacks. However, this appears not to be always the case.
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Table 2. Previously disclosed vulnerabilities analysed against the password managers
tested. A  indicates the application is vulnerable, a # indicates it is not.
Vulnerability
Password Manager
Dashlane LastPass Keeper 1Password RoboForm
2FA Seed # # # # #
Element Inspection    # #
Registration Discovery  # # # #
URL Mismatch  #    
HTTP(S) Autofill      
Ignoring Subdomains      
4.2 Discovered Vulnerabilities
Our extensive feature testing flagged some issues which we investigated further.
Here we present a developed proof-of-concept attack and three other vulnerabili-
ties of the tested password managers. Unlike previously disclosed vulnerabilities,
the ones we discuss here do not only concern web interfaces and some are related
to mobile or desktop applications.
Phishing Attack: Both the 1Password and LastPass Android applications were
found vulnerable to a phishing attack. The issue discovered was that both ap-
plications use weak matching criteria for identifying which stored credentials to
suggest for autofill. This allowed for a rogue application to impersonate a le-
gitimate one simply by crafting the package name to be identical. A developed
proof-of-concept attack is described in detail below for LastPass but essentially
the same attack applies to 1Password.
To identify the process used when matching an application and credentials,
a blank login screen was created. After selecting the Add Login option in the
LastPass pop-up, the URL shown in the LastPass application is the package
name of the application developed. This indicated that the matching criteria
employed by LastPass is based on the package name of the application only.
After discovering how LastPass matches applications and credentials, a mali-
cious app was developed with the package name of com.google. Again, this app
had a login screen; this can be seen in Figure 1. This login screen was designed to
mimic that of the official Google login screen and thereby be hard to distinguish.
The weak matching employed by LastPass means that if the malicious app is
launched, LastPass will offer to autofill the login page with Google credentials
stored in a user’s vault. This can be seen in Figure 2. In our proof-of-concept at-
tack, after a victim has selected their credentials from the LastPass pop-up and
tapped the Next button, the credentials are sent across to a server and stored
in a file. Hence, as long as the victim is tricked into installing and launching a
malicious application, their credential can be stolen easily leveraging the weak
matching used by 1Password and LastPass.
The attack developed here succeeds if the following conditions are met.
Firstly, the malicious app needs to be installed on the victim’s device. Attackers
might achieve this by either getting around app store security mechanisms (see
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Fig. 1. Login screen of the mali-
cious app mimics that of Google
Fig. 2. LastPass showing Google
credentials for the malicious app
e.g. [10] in the case of Google Play Store) or otherwise fooling the victim into
sideloading the app onto their device. This could be done in combination with
another phishing attack, for example, sending an email stating the targeted ser-
vice’s application requires an upgrade. Secondly, the victim needs to be a user of
the vulnerable password managers and using the LastPass or 1Password autofill
prompt, although other users may be fooled and enter their password manually.
Finally, the user needs to have credentials for the target application, in this
case, Google, in their vault. Having said these, if an organisation is identified as
a commercial user of a vulnerable password manager along with other services
(e.g. Google email service), the latter two conditions are met and a large-scale
phishing campaign may be launched against the organisation employees which
one expects to have some degree of success in stealing employee credentials and
thereby potentially compromising organisation security. The suggested mitiga-
tion for this vulnerability is for password managers to apply more strict matching
criteria that is not merely based on an app’s purported package name.
Clipboard Vulnerability: A crucial usability feature of password managers
is the ability to autofill credentials on a website. While autofill performs as
expected on an overwhelming majority of websites across all the password man-
agers tested, occasionally it would not. When the autofill feature does not work,
password managers often provide the option to copy credentials to the clipboard.
It was discovered during the initial testing phase that the tested password
managers do not provide enough protection surrounding copying sensitive items
to the clipboard, except 1Password. Standard computer security advice recom-
mends that a user locks their machine as soon as they leave it unattended and
if a user was to follow this advice, the risk associated with leaving passwords in
the clipboard should be reduced in theory. However, Windows 10 allows access
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to the clipboard of a locked machine [9]. This allows pasting in the value of the
clipboard in cleartext by an adversary that may be a person with physical access
to the machine or an application running on the machine. Although the attack
will not be aware as to what account this password is associated with, they can
try the credentials with a precompiled list of websites for which autofill is known
not to work. The suggested mitigation for this issue would be for the password
managers to provide an option to clear the clipboard after a set amount of time.
PIN Brute Force Vulnerability: To ease authentication to the Android ap-
plications, some password managers allow for a user to set a four digit PIN to
access the application. This removes the need for a user to enter a long, complex
master password every time they wish to enter their vault.
It was discovered during testing, that the RoboForm and Dashlane Android
applications do not correctly implement a persistent counter on the number of
times an incorrect PIN can be entered when trying to access the application. It
is possible to attempt two PINs consecutively, remove the application from the
recent application drawer, then try a further two PINs. Both PINs were four
digits long and therefore, have 10,000 combinations. Through extrapolation of
manual testing, it is estimated that even a manual random guessing attack is on
average expected to find a randomly selected PIN in 2.5 hours. If the attacker
was to factor in common PINs the results in [2] suggest that the attack time
would reduce to approximately 1.5 hours, and if the birth date of the victim
is known, around 8% of the PINs are expected to be found within the first six
guesses. We did not fully automate this attack, but we expect an automated
attack to take considerably less time to brute force the PIN.
This attack has the potential to be catastrophic for the victim. A malicious
attacker would have full access to the application, providing there is no prompt
for the user to re-authenticate using something other than the PIN. Access to the
application in both Dashlane and RoboForm enables the user to view, modify,
or delete records within the password manager’s vault.
The suggested mitigation for this issue is to implement a persistent counter
that is not reset when the application is removed from recent applications.
Possible Brute Force via Extension: All password managers tested have
web-based extensions that can be used to access the respective vaults. When
logging into the application after it has initially been locked, the user only needs
to enter their master password.
Our tests suggested that Keeper, Dashlane and 1Password were vulnerable
to a UI driven brute force attack when entering the master password. This was
because there appear to be no measures in place to halt multiple attempts when
logging into the extension. This suggested that it would be possible to mount a
dictionary attack against a user’s account.
Technically, the attack should be identified and halted by the password man-
ager vendors. When testing, ten incorrect passwords were attempted against
accounts with each of the password managers with no indication that a count on
the number of incorrect attempts was being kept in any of the five. RoboForm
implements a five second time delay after three incorrect passwords and in Last-
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Pass, there are multiple clicks required between entering successive passwords.
These measures slow down a possible attack, but do not prevent it.
Due to ethical reasons, the number of passwords attempted was considerably
less than would be required in a dictionary or brute force attack, and it is
possible that the vendors implement measures to identify larger number of login
attempts. Hence, we regard this as a possible vulnerability requiring further
investigation. The standard mitigation would be to lock the a user’s account
following a number of incorrect login attempts.
Summary: Table 3 shows a summary of the susceptibility of five tested password
managers to the discovered vulnerabilities. The reported issues are categorised
as an (implemented) attack, two vulnerabilities, and a potential vulnerability.
Table 3. Summary of new vulnerabilities discovered. A  indicates the application is
vulnerable, a G# indicates it is partially vulnerable, a # indicates it is not vulnerable.
Password Manager
Dashlane LastPass Keeper 1Password RoboForm
Attack:
Phishing #  #  #
Vulnerabilities:
Clipboard    #  
PIN Brute Force  # # #  
Possible vulnerability:
Extension Brute Force  G#   G#
Discussion on Feasibility and Impact: To further contextualise the discov-
ered attacks and vulnerabilities here, we discuss their feasibility and potential im-
pact. In our analysis, we adopt an approach similar to that of the Common Vul-
nerability Scoring System (CVSS) industry standard (see www.first.org/cvss)
to make it easier to translate our discussions here to CVSS scores if necessary.
The phishing attack discovered and developed here is a highly feasible attack.
It does not require any physical or privileged access to the device, but it does
require user interaction. As long as a victim is tricked into installing a malicious
app it will be able to present itself as a legitimate and rather indistinguishable
option on the autofill prompt and have a high chance of success. The impact of
the attack is limited to the loss of a single credential at a time, although this may
be a highly valuable credential (such as an email password) that could possibly
enable access to further accounts. The loss of a single credential enables the
attacker to get access to the compromised account, change content, and make
content unavailable by changing the credential, so the account is potentially
affected on all three aspects of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The clipboard vulnerability is limited to an attacker with physical access to
the device, however it does not require any privilege. This is an opportunistic
attack that requires a specific uncommon user action, i.e. copying credentials to
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the clipboard. The impact is loss of the credential, hence affecting confidentiality,
integrity, and availability for the compromised account.
The PIN brute force vulnerability may also enable an opportunistic attack.
It requires physical access to the victim’s device. Although it does not require
any further privilege of user interaction. The impact of the attack is much more
severe than the previous two attacks since a successful attacker gets access to the
entire password manager vault and any services whose passwords are managed by
the password manager. This means that a successful attacker may freely access
and modify the contents and credentials of all the managed accounts and hence
it amounts to severe possible loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
Finally, the possible brute force via extension vulnerability would only re-
quire network access to the victim’s device and no specific privilege or user
interaction. However, since a password is being brute forced, the probability of
success is typically less than the case where a PIN is targeted. Nevertheless,
the low complexity and remote executability of this attack make it a highly
feasible attack which if not mitigated can be exploited rather comfortably. The
attack also has the potential of a severe impact in the form of loss of the master
password that enables the attacker to access all the accounts managed by the
password manager. Hence, confidentiality, integrity, and availability may be all
severely impacted. Perhaps the only limitation of this attack is that it can be, at
least in theory, easily identified through detecting higher than usual frequency
of attempts to gain access to the targeted password manager account(s).
5 Responsible Disclosure
In this section we go through our disclosure of the vulnerabilities to the vendors
and their responses. We started discovering the vulnerabilities discussed here
in 2017. After confirming the persistence of issues and developing and success-
fully testing our proof-of-concept attack, we started notifying the five vendors in
2018. For more severe vulnerabilities, we emailed the technical team and in some
cases were asked to follow up the conversations through dedicated vulnerability
reporting programs. For less severe issues, vendors were contacted through sup-
port tickets on their website. We continued our disclosure until late 2018 when
we notified the vendors of our intention to publish our results in the form of an
academic paper after a further public non-disclosure period of six months.
In general we found all the five vendors quite responsive. However, only a
few disclosures resulted in a fix to be rolled out. This was due to many of the
disclosed issues being classified as low priority. In the following we discuss some
of the more notable interactions we had with the vendors.
The phishing vulnerability was disclosed to LastPass through their vulnera-
bility reporting system and to 1Password via email. In the case of LastPass, the
issue was marked as ‘External Behaviour > Browser Feature > Autocomplete
Enabled’ which has a priority of 5 (lowest priority) according the Bugcrowd Vul-
nerability Rating Taxonomy (see https://bit.ly/2XGbxYS) and therefore was
assigned a response of ‘Won’t Fix’. LastPass had no further comment.
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The clipboard vulnerability was communicated to all vendors affected. Dash-
lane stated that unlike mobile OSs such as Android, Windows does not provide
any expiration mechanism for partial removal of data on clipboard and hence
the only way to remove data from clipboard would be to delete all data on it.
This would make such a solution quite invasive. Keeper responded that clipboard
expiration was supported on iOS devices only. RoboForm told us that “if you
are using copy/paste actions for inserting some passwords from the RoboForm
Editor, you will need to clear the clipboard manually.”
The PIN brute force vulnerability was disclosed to the affected vendors in-
cluding 1Password via their reporting system. 1Password fixed the issue within
11 days of reporting and emphasised that this vulnerability requires access to
an unlocked Android device to be exploited. Dashlane told us they will add a
persistent counter and later added that “this issue requires access to an unlocked
android device to be exploited”, implying a low priority.
The extension brute force vulnerability was disclosed to all vendors. 1Pass-
word responded that it would be infeasible to guess a user’s master credentials.
6 Conclusion
This work has analysed and reported on vulnerabilities in commercial password
managers through two distinct avenues: testing previously disclosed vulnera-
bilities and developing exploits for newly discovered vulnerabilities. Many of
the previously reported vulnerabilities have been found to persist in popular
password managers. Furthermore, four new vulnerabilities were found through
extensive testing and responsibly disclosed to the corresponding vendors. Some
were fixed immediately while others were deemed low priority.
In our correspondence with password manager vendors we saw both positive
and negative sides to how they deal with vulnerability disclosure. On the positive
side, vendors appear to be quite responsive and issues deemed high priority or
easily rectifiable are fixed promptly. On the negative side, issues assessed as low
priority appear to be considered non-issues and rather too easily dismissed.
We acknowledge that some issues, e.g. the clipboard vulnerability, do not
have an easy fix and vendors faced with a choice between leaving a low priority
issue and applying a fix that has side effects may choose the former.
A possible future direction would be developing rigorous security models and
canonical security tests for password managers. The newly discovered vulnera-
bilities is this work were all user interface related vulnerabilities, as in they were
discovered by testing the applications under typical operation scenarios. Such
functionality tests along with further analyses focusing on architecture and pro-
cesses may serve as a basis for standard tests.
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A Full List of Password Managers and Features
The 19 password managers we considered are (alphabetically): 1Password, Dash-
lane, EnPass, KeePass, Keeper, LastPass, LogMeOnce, mSecure, Password Boss,
Password Manager Pro, Password Safe, PasswordState, RoboForm, SplashID,
Sticky Password, TeamPassword Manager, TeamsID, TrueKey, and Zoho Vault.
The 27 features considered are as follows (in no specific order): Mobile Appli-
cations, Extension Support, Bookmarklet, AutoFill, Form Fill, Password Cap-
ture (automatically saving entered passwords), Password Generation (generating
new strong passwords), Multi Device Sync, Biometric Authentication, AES-256
Encryption, Vault Backup/Export Functionality, Password Sharing (with other
users), Two Factor Authentication, Store data types other than passwords, Auto-
matic Password Changes (e.g. on a regular basis), Portable App, Security Breach
Alerts, Password Change Listener, Commercial Offering (for organisations), Ad-
min Console (for organisation admins), Active Directory Integration, Reports
and Auditing, Personal and Business Password segmentation (on the same app),
Group Password Sharing, Manage User Account and Roles (for organisation
admins), Custom Password Policies, and API Provision.
